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The discussion of immigration and national security is rarely about what 
it should be about.  What it ought to be about is how the U.S. government 
should use the various tools of immigration policy—visas, background 
checks, identity verification, border searches, and internal enforcement of 
immigration laws—to try to keep out or remove those who might pose a 
serious threat to the United States.  Instead, since the September 11 terrorist 
attacks, national security arguments have been used to justify the expansion 
of enforcement measures that are part of a larger effort to identify and 
remove illegal immigrants, and have raised the hurdles for entry by all 
immigrants.  The result has been a set of policy measures that are doing 
more to undermine U.S. national security than to enhance it. 
Prior to 9/11, immigration was rarely considered as a national security 
issue.  Most of the debates over immigration in the 1980s and 1990s had 
focused either on economic questions, such as the number and mix of legal 
immigrants the United States should be accepting, or on law enforcement 
questions, such as how best to discourage illegal immigrants from jumping 
the queue in search of economic opportunity.  But the September 11 attacks 
changed the debate in fundamental ways that continue to ripple through 
many different facets of immigration law. 
As the 9/11 Commission concluded, the failure of the U.S. government 
to detect and disrupt the September 11 plot was primarily a failure of 
intelligence sharing.1  Immigration and visa policy mistakes also played a 
part in allowing the hijackers into the country, but the Commission’s own 
judgment on their importance can be inferred from its decision to relegate 
                                                
* Bernard L. Schwartz Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR); Master’s 
in International Relations, University of California, Berkeley.  Former Washington bureau 
chief for the Financial Times. 
1 THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (2004). 
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its investigation of that issue to a supplemental staff report.2 
Others have found immigration policy more culpable, however.  One of 
the first U.S. government officials to highlight the role of immigration 
policy in relation to the 9/11 attacks was Kris Kobach, a young Kansas law 
professor who was awarded a prestigious White House fellowship in 2001 
and was detailed to the Justice Department to work on immigration issues.  
After September 11, like everyone else at Justice, he was looking for new 
ways to prevent another devastating terrorist attack.  He seized on the 
question of whether a more aggressive campaign of immigration 
enforcement might have foiled the plot.  
Of the nineteen September 11 hijackers, five of them were in violation 
of U.S. immigration law at the time of the attacks—having overstayed or 
otherwise violated the terms of the visas that admitted them to the United 
States.  Four of those five, including three of the pilots, had actually been 
stopped by local police at some time in the previous year for traffic 
violations.  One of the pilots, Ziad Jarrah, was pulled over by a Maryland 
police officer two days before the attacks.  Jarrah was driving at 95 miles-
per-hour heading north on Interstate 95 near the Delaware border.  But 
when the officer ran the usual wants and warrants, nothing showed up.  So 
he wrote Jarrah a $270 ticket and sent him on his way.  At the time, 
however, Jarrah had overstayed his tourist visa and, thus, had no right to be 
in the United States.  But that information was not in the data that was 
checked by local police officers.  In theory, had such information been 
available to local police, three of the four pilots might have been identified 
as illegal immigrants, detained, and deported, and the plot would never have 
got off the ground.3  As Kobach would later conclude: “The abuse of 
immigration laws was instrumental in the deaths of nearly 3,000 people.”4  
Tougher enforcement of immigration laws became central to the Bush 
administration response after 9/11.  Most of the Muslim men who were 
rounded up and incarcerated for many months on suspicion of involvement 
                                                
2 9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the United States (2004), http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/911_Terr 
Trav_Monograph.pdf. 
3 EDWARD ALDEN, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN BORDER: TERRORISM, IMMIGRATION 
AND SECURITY SINCE 9/11 (2009).  
4 Kris Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local 
Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 179 (2005). 
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with the attacks were held in custody on immigration violations.5  Kobach 
became the architect of the National Security Entry Exit Registration 
System (NSEERS), also known as Special Registration, which increased 
scrutiny of foreign male tourists, students, business travelers, and 
immigrants coming to the United States from about two dozen “countries of 
concern,” most of them Muslim countries.6  The Bush administration ended 
a practice known as “catch and release,” in which most illegal immigrants 
arrested on immigration charges would be released until their court dates 
before an immigration judge.  Fearing that a terrorist might be detained and 
then released, the U.S. government now incarcerates most of the illegal 
immigrants it detains until their court dates.  The Bush administration also 
aggressively expanded the authority of local police forces under an existing 
scheme that had not previously been used, known as 287(g), which allows 
the federal government to delegate to state and local police forces expanded 
immigration enforcement powers.7  The Justice Department’s Office of 
Legal Counsel (OLC) went further, concluding that state and local law 
enforcement officials have inherent powers to enforce immigration laws, 
reversing a Clinton administration OLC opinion from 1996.8  And the 
Obama administration has developed its own program, known as Secure 
Communities, which involves checking the immigration status of those 
arrested for criminal violations.  
There were certainly sound national security reasons for improving the 
                                                
5 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, The September 11 Detainees: 
A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the 
Investigation of the September 11 Attacks, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oig/ 
detainees.pdf.  
6 For a review of the NSEERS program and its impacts, see Shoba Sivraprasad Wadhia, 
NSEERS: The Consequences of America’s Efforts to Secure its Borders, Dickinson School 
of Law, Penn State University (2009), http://www.adc.org/PDF/nseerspaper.pdf; see also 
Robert Bonner & Edward Alden, The Wrong Way to Screen Visitors, WASH. POST, Nov. 
21, 2009.  
7 Nearly 70 state and local police forces have signed Memoranda of Agreement with 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to implement the 287(g) program.  Most of 
those agreements were entered into in 2007 and 2008 during the last two years of the Bush 
administration.  See ICE Fact Sheet,  http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/factsheets/pdf 
/287g.pdf; see also Cristina Rodriguez, Muzaffar Chishti, Randy Capps & Laura St. John, 
Migration Policy Institute, A Program in Flux: New Priorities and Implementation 
Challenges for 287(g) (2010), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/287g-March2010.pdf. 
8 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for the Attorney 
General re: Non-preemption of the Authority of State and Local Law Enforcement 
Officials to Arrest Aliens for Immigration Violations (Apr. 3, 2002). 
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enforcement of immigration laws.  The 9/11 attacks had shown that 
terrorists were capable of exploiting weaknesses in U.S. immigration and 
visa laws to enter the United States and remain here while they plotted the 
attacks.9  Many of the initiatives launched over the past decade—including 
greater security of passports and other identity documents, biometric 
verification of identity, and the collection of advanced information on 
incoming passengers—have made it harder for would-be terrorists to enter 
the United States.  And the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security 
have been able to use immigration violations to arrest and deport some 
individuals suspected of having ties with terrorist groups.  
But the national security argument has also been exploited effectively 
by those whose primary agenda is not advancing national security, but 
rather restricting immigration.  Consider the publications of the Center for 
Immigration Studies (CIS), a research group that advocates lower levels of 
immigration.  Their website lists about 170 publications from 1986 through 
September 2001, not a single one of which focused on immigration policy 
and national security.  The pre-9/11 papers concerned matters such as the 
impact of immigration on labor markets, social welfare costs, cultural 
identity, rule of law and other issues that have long been a staple of the 
immigration debate in this country.  But since 9/11, roughly half of the CIS 
publications have been about various aspects of how U.S. immigration 
policies threaten national security.10  This shift in the discussion of 
immigration can be interpreted in different ways.  It is true that September 
11 was a wake-up call for many that weak or poorly enforced immigration 
laws could pose a security risk.  But it is also clearly true that, after 9/11, 
the terrorist threat became a particularly compelling argument in favor of 
something that CIS and other groups had long advocated—namely lower 
immigration levels and a crackdown on illegal immigration. 
Kris Kobach’s subsequent career underscores the links between the 
national security argument and a traditional restrictionist agenda.  After 
leaving the government in 2003, Kobach was hired to mount a legal defense 
for the town of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, whose mayor Lou Barletta was 
championing an ordinance that would penalize local businesses and 
landlords for employing or renting to illegal immigrants.11  Kobach became 
                                                
9 For a fuller discussion of the shortcomings of pre-9/11 visa and immigration policies, see 
ALDEN, supra note 3 . 
10 Center for Immigration Studies, Publications, http://www.cis.org/publications.  
11 The Hazleton ordinance was recently struck down by the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals, 
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the primary legal architect of SB 1070, the controversial Arizona law that 
would increase the powers of state and local police to question individuals 
on their immigration status.  That law has been temporarily stayed as a 
result of a legal challenge by the Obama administration.  Kobach has also 
defended Sheriff Joe Arpaio, the Arizona lawman who has been 
investigated by the United States Department of Justice Civil Rights 
Division amid accusations of discrimination and unconstitutional searches 
and seizures in connection with immigration enforcement.  Kobach has 
argued that Arpaio can ignore Washington, because he and all local sheriffs 
have inherent authority to stop and question people on their immigration 
status, and to carry out immigration arrests.12  
Whatever the motivations of the various players, there are two things 
that are clear about the relationship between national security and 
immigration law in the post 9/11 era.  First, the United States in the past 
decade has greatly expanded its immigration enforcement efforts, largely in 
response to the terrorist attack.  Secondly, the overwhelming majority of 
those affected by this stepped-up immigration enforcement do not pose any 
sort of national security threat, terrorist or otherwise.  
What if we try to stand back, then, and simply ask the question: “What 
role can immigration policies play in preventing another terrorist attack in 
the United States?”  The answer is a very limited role.  There are two main 
reasons for this. 
The first is what can be called the “targeting problem.”  We know 
enough about al-Qaeda and its operations to recognize that the United States 
is not facing a mass terrorist army, but rather a fairly small number of 
trained operatives with the capacity to inflict enormous damage.  CIA 
director Leon Panetta has said that maybe 50 to 100 al-Qaeda fighters 
remain in Afghanistan, while National Counterterrorism Center Director 
Michael Leiter has estimated that there are probably another 300 in 
neighboring Pakistan.13  Even accounting for the various other sympathetic 
                                                                                                                       
which ruled that the ordinance interfered with federal primacy in immigration law.  See 
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010).  Former Hazleton mayor Lou 
Barletta was elected to Congress in November, 2010 as a Republican candidate running on 
the Tea Party platform. 
12 Valeria Fernandez, Arizona Sheriff Arpaio to Unleash 800 Deputies on Undocumented 
Immigrants, NEW AM. MEDIA, Feb. 15, 2010. 
13 Peter Bergen, The Evolving Nature of Terrorism Nine Years After the 9/11 Attacks, 
Testimony Before the House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee (2010), 
24 ST. JOHN’S JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL  [Vol. 1, No. 1 
& COMPARATIVE LAW 
groups around the world, identifying terrorists is a needle in a haystack 
problem of figuring out who the bad guys are when they are swimming in a 
huge sea of ordinary people.  On any given day, about 1.1 million peoples 
enter the United States, of whom some 700,000 are foreign nationals.  Some 
of those will turn out not to have the proper documents or otherwise be 
ineligible to enter the United States, and Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) officers will turn them around at the port-of-entry.  The Border 
Patrol is still apprehending about 2,000 people each day trying to cross the 
southern border illegally, which is less than half of the peak levels of a 
decade ago and the lowest since the early 1970s.  But that is still a lot of 
people. 
For effective counterterrorism, however, you need good intelligence that 
helps to identify the genuine threats among this huge number of border 
crossers.  Take the case of Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the so-called 
Christmas bomber who narrowly failed to ignite explosives he had 
concealed in his underwear before boarding a trans-Atlantic airliner bound 
for Detroit.  He was legally entitled to get on a plane to the United States, 
since he possessed a valid U.S.-government issued tourist visa.  “Enforcing 
immigration laws” would have done nothing to keep him off the plane.  The 
failure was rather a targeting failure—the U.S. government as a whole knew 
enough about Abdulmutallab that his visa should have been revoked and his 
name placed on the “no-fly” list to keep him off the flight.  Instead, the 
State Department failed to act on what it knew, and while CBP officials 
identified him as a target of concern (thanks to the advanced passenger 
information that airlines must now provide), their plan was to question him 
after he arrived in Detroit.  The almost successful Christmas attack was a 
failure of timely intelligence analysis and synthesis, not a failure of 
immigration enforcement.14  
A similar pattern can be seen in the use of immigration enforcement 
laws domestically.  Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the DHS 
branch responsible for interior immigration enforcement, periodically issues 
public updates on its use of immigration laws in terrorism-related cases.  
The most recent update, in November 2008, details more than a dozen cases 
                                                                                                                       
http://health.newamerica.net/publications/resources/2010/the_evolving_nature_of_terroris
m_nine_years_after_the_911_attacks_0. 
14 For the declassified summary of the investigation into the failed bombing by the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, see S. REP. NO. 111-199 (2010), available at 
http://intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/111199.pdf. 
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in which individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism were order 
deported.  But in not a single one of those cases were the individuals 
identified as a result of immigration violations.  Instead, they were all 
targeted as a result of successful criminal or intelligence investigations, and 
immigration law was simply the means for removing them from the 
country.15 
The most effective use of immigration powers is in support of 
intelligence gathering efforts.  Any measure that can help to target particular 
suspect individuals has a national security value.  These include the 
gathering detailed information on airline passengers, taking fingerprints 
from visa applicants and arriving travelers, and running background checks 
on a very limited number of individuals who may raise red flags.  There are 
civil liberty and privacy concerns that must be weighed in such efforts, but 
their contribution to security is demonstrable.  In contrast, broader measures 
such as the detention of all immigration violators, or the scrutiny of huge 
groups of individuals under programs like NSEERS have made little 
demonstrable contribution to security.  The most that could be said by the 
9/11 Commission investigators was that better routine enforcement of 
immigration laws may “raise obstacles for and in some cases have a 
deterrent effect on individuals intending to commit terrorist attacks.”16 
The second reason that immigration policy has limited utility as a 
national security tool is what can be called the “adaptability problem.”  If 
the United States relies on immigration-related controls to keep out or 
remove terrorists, the terrorists will adapt, by making sure their operatives 
comply with the relevant immigration laws and by finding recruits who are 
already inside the United States.  That appears to be exactly what has 
happened in the decade since 9/11.  The Center for Immigration Studies in 
2002 did a study looking at some 48 individuals who were charged or 
convicted or admitted involvement in terrorist plots inside the United States 
between 1993 and 2001, including the 9/11 attacks.  The study found that 
one-third of those 48 were in the U.S. on legal temporary visas, another 
third were lawful permanent residents or naturalized U.S. citizens.  One-
quarter of them, however, were illegal immigrants, mostly visa overstayers.  
                                                
15 The only individual who was not part of a targeted investigation was a Yemeni man 
intercepted by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) after he tried to smuggle a 
knife aboard a domestic flight.  See Fact Sheet: ICE’s Use of Immigration and Customs 
Authorities to Address National Security Threats (2008), http://www.ice.gov/news/library/ 
factsheets/terrorism-threats.htm. 
16 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, supra note 2, at 160. 
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So there was a plausible argument that, prior to 9/11, tougher immigration 
enforcement could have disrupted some of these terrorist plots.17 
But the picture has changed markedly in the past decade.  According to 
a list compiled by the Heritage Foundation, between October 2001 and 
October 2010, there have been nearly 30 foiled terrorist plots inside the 
United States, directly involving 63 individuals who were in the United 
States at the time of their arrest.18  From independent research, we found 
that of those 61 individuals, 31 were U.S.-born citizens, 14 were naturalized 
citizens, one was a dual citizen, nine were legal immigrants or visa-holders 
and only seven were illegal immigrants.  One individual’s status could not 
be determined.  So, for the sake of argument, if the United States had in 
place a perfect immigration enforcement system, it might have 
preemptively arrested six of the plotters, or just over 10 percent of the total.  
A similar conclusion was reached in the detailed 2010 investigation of the 
terrorist threat to the United States led by terrorism experts Peter Bergen 
and Bruce Hoffman.  Using a broader measure of terrorism-related 
incidents, they found that 43 U.S. citizens had been involved in terrorist 
activities in 2009 alone.  They concluded that the key shift in recent years 
“is the increasingly prominent role in planning and operations that U.S. 
citizens and residents have played in the leadership of Al-Qaeda and aligned 
groups, and the higher number of Americans attaching themselves to these 
groups.”19 
It’s almost certainly true that the number of illegal immigrants involved 
                                                
17 Steven Camarota, The Open Door: How Militant Islamic Terrorists Entered and 
Remained in the United States, 1993–2001, http://www.cis.org/articles/2002/Paper21/ 
terrorism.html. 
18 Jena Baker McNeill, James Carafano & Jessica Zuckerman, 30 Terrorist Plots Foiled: 
How the System Worked (2010), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/04/30-
terrorist-plots-foiled-how-the-system-worked.  Of this original list, we only took into 
consideration the plots that were planned after September 11, 2001 for execution on U.S. 
territory, including U.S. embassies and military facilities.  These criteria exclude two of the 
plots that McNeill et al. include in their April 2010 report.  These two excluded plots were 
the 2006 plot by 24 men, arrested in London, to blow up a commercial airline flight and the 
arrest of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed for his role in the 9/11 attacks.  In addition, we 
included a subsequent plot, the attempted Times Square attack by Faisal Shahzad, the only 
such plot known to be foiled between April 2010 and October 2010.  
19 Peter Bergen & Bruce Hoffman, Assessing the Terrorist Threat: A Report of the 
Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Preparedness Group (2010), 
http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG%20Final%20Threat%20Assessm
ent.pdf. 
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in such plots has shrunk because immigration enforcement has made it 
harder to enter to the United States illegally, or to remain here.  But terrorist 
groups have just worked around the problem, in particular by recruiting 
U.S. citizens.  Similarly, Bergen and Hoffman found that terrorist groups 
had bypassed ethnic and racial profiling programs like NSEERS by 
recruiting jihadists “who do not fit any particular ethnic, economic, 
educational or social profile.”  Given the adaptive capability of terrorist 
groups, enforcement of immigration laws is at best going to have a small 
role to play in preventing future terror attacks inside the U.S.  
To be clear, the limited utility of immigration enforcement in national 
security is not an argument per se against immigration enforcement.  There 
are a host of very good and legitimate reasons for the United States to do a 
better job enforcing its immigration laws.  But preventing terrorist attacks is 
not one of those reasons. 
The problem is that, by enforcing immigration laws as if U.S. national 
security were at stake, the U.S. government has inadvertently served to 
weaken some of the foundations that underpin U.S. national security.  The 
United States became the world’s greatest military power because it 
developed and harnessed the most advanced technologies and techniques 
for warfare.  Its future security depends on maintaining that leadership. 
Gordon England, the former deputy defense secretary in the Bush 
Administration, told investigators for the National Research Council in 
2007 that: “The greatest long-term threat to U.S. national security is not 
terrorists wielding a nuclear or biological weapon, but the erosion of 
America’s place as a world leader in science and technology.”  After 9/11, 
that obvious conclusion was forgotten. 
Immigrants have long been a critical part of the U.S. scientific and 
technological enterprise.  Foreign students and immigrants make up more 
than half of the scientific researchers in the United States.  Immigrants file 
25 per cent of the patent applications, roughly twice their representation in 
the population.  In 2009, the Nobel Prizes in the sciences went to nine 
people—three Americans, two Canadians, and one each from Australia, 
Hong Kong, India and Israel.  All of them were educated at American 
universities, and eight made their careers in the United States.  If these 
people stop coming here and doing cutting edge scientific research, the 
costs to America’s national security will be incalculable.  There is a 
straight-line connection between the U.S. ability to attract talented 
immigrants, and its economic and military prowess.  As Yale’s Amy Chua 
has argued in her history of the great powers: “To pull away from its rivals 
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on a global scale, a society must pull into itself and motivate the world’s 
best and brightest, regardless of ethnicity, religion or background.”20  No 
country has done that better than the United States. 
But in the name of national security, U.S. immigration policy since 9/11 
has instead been driving many of those people away.21  New York Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg has called recent U.S. immigration policy a road to 
“national suicide.”  The problems include visa delays, restrictive quotas for 
skilled workers, and limited opportunities for gaining permanent residence, 
especially for nationals of big countries like China and India.  Foreign 
students had come to the United States in steadily increasingly numbers for 
virtually all of the post-World War II period.  After 9/11, however, foreign 
student enrollment declined for several years and has only recently 
recovered to pre-9/11 levels.  More worrisome, foreign graduate student 
numbers fell sharply and have still not fully recovered.  All this occurred in 
a decade in which the international student population soared.  The UK 
nearly doubled its inflows of foreign students, as did Australia, France and 
New Zealand saw similar gains.  Overall, the U.S. share of the world’s 
foreign students fell from 28 per cent in 2000 to 21 percent by 2008. If the 
pre-9/11 trends had instead continued, foreign student enrollment would 
have been 25 per cent higher than it is today.22  
The United States has also damaged its moral leadership.  This has long 
been a country of immigrants, and, with some sad and notable historical 
exceptions, the U.S. government has generally treated immigrants with 
respect, fairness and dignity.  Unfortunately, in the aftermath of 9/11, the 
past decade has been one of those periods that will not stand up well when 
the history books are written.  
To take just one of many possible examples, one of the policies adopted 
by the Department of Homeland Security after September 11 was to end 
what was known as “catch and release.”  Catch and release was shorthand 
for a practice in which, if an illegal immigrant were apprehended in the 
                                                
20 AMY CHUA, DAY OF EMPIRE: HOW HYPERPOWERS RISE TO GLOBAL DOMINANCE AND 
WHY THEY FALL (2007). 
21 Posting of Edward Alden to World Politics Review, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com 
/articles/6142/u-s-losing-ground-in-competitive-immigration (July 27, 2010). 
22 Susan K. Brown & Frank D. Bean, Post 9/11 International Graduate Enrollment in the 
United States: Unintended Consequences of National Security Strategies, in IMMIGRATION 
POLICY AND SECURITY: U.S., EUROPEAN AND COMMONWEALTH PERSPECTIVES (Terri E. 
Givens et al. eds., 2009). 
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United States, in most cases he or she would be released and told to appear 
on a certain date before an immigration judge, who would determine 
whether that individual would be deported.  Not surprisingly, many of those 
apprehended did not show up for their court dates.  One such individual, 
Ghazi Ibrahim Abu Maizar, came across illegally from Canada and was 
arrested and released, and turned out to be a Palestinian terrorist who in 
1997 tried to set off a bomb in the Brooklyn subway.  After September 11, 
DHS took on the sizeable project of ending “catch and release” by building 
enough jail cells to incarcerate all those apprehended while they waited for 
their court dates. 
As a result, on any given day there are about 32,000 of these people in 
jails, up from about 7,000 per day in the mid-90s.23  Only they are not 
terrorists; they are people who came to the United States illegally to work, 
or came here legally and fell out of status for one reason or another by, for 
example, overstaying a tourist visa or violating the terms of a student visa.  
The conditions of these jails are pretty horrific, although improvements are 
now being made.  Studies by the Migration Policy Institute, Human Rights 
Watch and other groups have documented woeful medical treatment, 
individuals moved across the continent from their families without family-
notification, as well as families jailed with children.24  Incarceration is 
expensive as well; it costs about $100 a day to keep immigration violators 
in prison, compared with alternatives to detention that cost a fraction of that 
amount.  DHS has itself acknowledged these problems, and a priority of the 
Obama administration has been to try to fix the mess.  But it was a mess 
created by the idea that tough immigration enforcement was necessary to 
protect the United States from terrorist attacks. 
The U.S. government has built many of the elements of a border and 
immigration control system that allow for intelligent judgments about who 
might pose a threat to the United States and should therefore not be 
admitted to the country.  There has been genuine progress in patching the 
many holes of the pre-9/11 regime.  But the laudable effort has been 
perverted by those who misuse the national security argument as a pretext 
for immigration restrictions.  The result has been significant damage, and if 
                                                
23 Donald Kerwin & Serena Yi-Ying Lin, Migration Policy Institute, Immigrant Detention: 
Can ICE Meet Its Legal Imperatives and Case Management Responsibilities? (2009), 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/detentionreportSept1009.pdf. 
24 See Kerwin & Lin, id.; see also Human Rights Watch, Locked Up Far Away: The 
Transfer of Immigrants to Remote Detention Centers in the United States (2009), 
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/86789. 
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it is not addressed lasting damage, to some of the foundations of U.S. 
economic strength and its national security. 
